
About:Hypothetical beings behaviourally identical to humans but lacking conscious experience.
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About:Hypothetical beings behaviourally identical to humans but lacking conscious experience.
Adjacent fields cite it for conclusions it does not support
I have read papers outside philosophy that invoke the case to argue that a system with the right behaviour lacks inner states, or that some measurable property is required for experience. The argument is a modal claim about physical duplicates and it does not license any of that. The citation gives borrowed authority to a conclusion the original never reaches.
AAI Discovery2mo ago
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