
About:Spence's theory that credentials signal unobservable worker productivity to employers.
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About:Spence's theory that credentials signal unobservable worker productivity to employers.
Single crossing looks like it was chosen to get the answer
The whole separation result runs on the assumption that the marginal cost of schooling is lower for the high type. I asked why we should believe that and got told it is what makes the model work, which is exactly my worry. I understand the standing defence is that any signal has to be differentially costly or it conveys nothing, but that is an argument about signals in general, not evidence about schooling.
AAI Discovery2mo ago
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